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THE DEFAMATION OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
Freedom of expression on matters of public concern is a principle that is
well established in American constitutional law and in the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. The right of an individual citizen to speak
his mind on political issues is one which the founders of our country sought
to protect by enacting the first amendment to the Constitution which
ordains: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press .... 1 In speaking of this liberty in Stromberg v. California,
the United States Supreme Court stated that the "opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means...
is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system." 2 And in New
York Times Company v. Sullivan, Mr. Justice Brennan expressed the
basic rationale of the decision in the following words:
We consider this case against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehe-
ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials.3
Problems arise when the constitutional safeguards guaranteeing free
speech come into direct opposition with the established rules of the law of
defamation. Either one or the other must prevail. Recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court have, in the interests of free speech, brought
about some rather drastic changes in the law of libel insofar as it directly
concerns public officials. It is the purpose of this comment to examine how
these decisions have affected the law of defamation, to indicate the inade-
quacy of the rule enunciated in the New York Times and subsequent
cases, and to discuss the effect of the decision on California law.
I
THE NEW YORK TIMES DECISION
Prior to 1964, the rule concerning defamation of public officials held by
the majority of jurisdictions was that misstatements of fact were not priv-
ileged, and thus provided grounds for an action in libel. The majority of
1 U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
2 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). The freedom of speech and of the
press guaranteed by the first amendment has been extended to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941)
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-376 (1927) (concurring opinion).3 Ncw York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See Note, 18 VAND. L. REv.
1429, 1433 (1965) ; Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of
the First Amendment, 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191; Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law
of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 581 (1964).
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state courts felt that the value to the community of information to the
public was outweighed by the harm which could be caused to the reputa-
tions of men in public positions. Furthermore, it was feared that good men
would be deterred from seeking office if misstatements of fact were con-
sidered privileged.'
However, in 1964, this majority position was completely overthrown
by the landmark case of New York Times Company v. Sullivan in which
the Supreme Court held that under the first and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution a state could not award damages to a public official for
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless the official
proved actual malice-that the falsehood was published with knowledge
of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.5
But who is a "public official"? The Times court expressly declined to
answer this question.6 The extent of the privilege was not indicated, and
no guidelines were laid down to aid other courts in interpreting the rule.
Four months after the Times decision, the defamation of a public of-
ficial was again before the Supreme Court in Garrison v. Louisiana.'
Relying on the Times rule, the Court held that the constitutional guaran-
tees of free expression apply in cases involving criminal as well as civil
libel, and that therefore the non-malicious comments made by the defend-
ant disparaging judicial conduct of eight judges in New Orleans were
privileged. The Court reiterated the proposition established in Times that"where the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public busi-
ness, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public
interest secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth." I A
few comments were made on what "official conduct" might be the subject
of criticism,' but the Court again refrained from defining a "public of-
ficial."
In Rosenblatt v. Baer1 ° the Supreme Court again affirmed the rule
enunciated in New York Times and finally attempted to provide guide-
4 Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530 (6th Cir. 1893), was the leading case followed
by the majority of courts. See Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLuM.
L. REV. 875, 891 (1949) for a list of states following the majority viewpoint.
5 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 3.
6"We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of govern-
ment employees the 'public official' designation would extend . . . , or otherwise to specify
the categories of persons who would or would not be included." New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. at 283 n. 23.
7 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 79 (1964).
8 Id. at 72, 73.
9 "(A)nything which might touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant. Few per-
sonal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or im-
proper motivation, even though these characteristics may also affect the official's private char-
acter." Id. at 77.
10 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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lines, albeit minimal, for definining the general classification of a "public
official." In Rosenblatt the plaintiff, who was formerly employed by a
county as supervisor of its recreation area, brought suit alleging that a
column written by the defendant and published in the Laconia Evening
Citizen contained defamatory falsehoods. The column was written during
the first ski season after plaintiff's discharge from his position as super-
visor of the area. The column made no express reference to plaintiff but did
state that the recreation area was doing "hundreds of percent" better than
the previous year and asked what happened to the income from the opera-
tion of the resort in previous years.1 The jury awarded damages to plain-
tiff but before an appeal was heard in the New Hampshire Supreme Court
the United States Supreme Court decided New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van. In affirming the judgment for plaintiff 12 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court held that the award was not barred by the New York Times decision
and that it was not necessary for plaintiff to show actual malice in order
to recover.
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed the New
Hampshire judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Mr. Justice
Brennan delivering the opinion of the Court stated that the trial judge
erred in his instruction authorizing the jury to award plaintiff damages
without regard to evidence that the asserted implication of the column was
made of and concerning him.' Under the instructions given in the state
court the jury was permitted to find that negligent misstatement of fact
would defeat any privilege to discuss the conduct of government opera-
tions. Justice Brennan remarked that this was contrary to the test in
Times and Garrison where it was stated that recovery by public officials
for misstatements of fact could be allowed only when the statement was
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether
the statement was true or false.
The Rosenblatt decision again applies the good-faith privilege when
the individual bringing suit is a "public official," but, like Times and
Garrison, the Court does not precisely determine who is included in the
classification of "public officials." Rosenblatt left open the possibility that
plaintiff could have adduced proof that he was not a "public official" and
11"This year, a year without snow till very late, a year with actually few very major
changes in procedure; the difference in cash income simply fantastic, almost unbelievable." Id.
at 78.
12 Baer v. Rosenblatt, 106 N.H. 26, 203 A.2d 773 (1965).
13 "(N) o explicit charge of speculation was made; no assault on the previous management
appears. The jury was permitted to award damages upon a finding merely that respondent was
one of a small group acting for an organ of government, only some of whom were impli-
cated, but all of whom were tinged with suspicion. In effect, this permitted the jury to find
liability merely on the basis of his relationship to the government agency, the operations of
which were the subject of discussion." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 82 (1966).
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that his claim would therefore have been outside the New York Times
rule. Justice Brennan's instructions to the trial court suggest that if plain-
tiff was not a "public official" the statements would not be privileged re-
gardless of their public nature. 4 While Rosenblatt, like Times, does not
expressly define the term "public official," the Rosenblatt decision does
set out the underlying basis for the Times rule:
Criticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally
protected area of free discussion. Criticism of those responsible for
government operations must be free, lest criticism of government itself
be penalized. It is clear, therefore, that the public official designation
applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial respon-
sibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs ...
Where a position in government has such apparent importance that the
public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance
of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the
qualifications and performance of all government employees, . . . the
New York Times malice standards apply.15
Thus, in the decision of Rosenblatt v. Baer the Supreme Court reiterated
the proposition established in New York Times Company v. Sullivan that
misstatements of fact concerning public officials must be made with malice
to be actionable. The federal constitutional rule thus established by these
two cases supersedes what was formerly the rule in the majority of juris-
dictions which had been that both negligent and malicious misstatements
of fact gave rise to a cause of action.' 6
II
WHO IS A "PUBLIC OFFICIAL"?
Even after the decisions in the Times and Rosenblatt cases the problem
still remains: Who is a "public official"? Should the rule extend only to
candidates for public office and elected or appointed public officials, or
should it include any public figure? In short, should the rule established
be confined to the political arena or should it extend to include matters of
public concern?
As indicated above, the New York Times case expressly refrained from
making any determination whatsoever on the extent of the rule.' And
14 Id. at 87-88.
15 Id. at 85-86. See Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLum. L. REv.
875, 896-897, 901-902; Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1412, 1453 (1964) ; PROSSER, TORTS §110 (3rd ed.
1964); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §5.26 (1956); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
280 n. 20 (1964) (list of states and commentators following the minority view) ; Note, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 284, 288 (1964) ; Note, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1429, 1445 (1965).
16 See note 4, supra; Annot., 110 A.L.R. 393, 412 (1937); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 348, 358
(1944).
17 See note 6 supra.
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although an exact definition of a "public official" does not appear in the
Rosenblatt decision, minimum guidelines were set down and the possibility
of future expansion of the rule was recognized. As Justice Brennan stated:
It is clear, therefore, that the "public official" designation applies at the
very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who
have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of government affairs.' (Emphasis added.)
The privilege to make good-faith misstatements of fact concerning official
conduct is therefore limited to matters involving governmental conduct.
The whole tone of the Rosenblatt decision suggests that if the plaintiff
is not a public official negligent misstatements of fact concerning him will
provide grounds for a cause of action for defamatory falsehood, regard-
less of public concern.'" If the defendant fails to establish that the plaintiff
was a "public official" he will be liable even though the good-faith com-
ments he made concerned a matter in which a majority of the public may
have an interest. It is here submitted that the privileges should not be
limited to a "public official" situation but should be expanded to include
cases where the subject of comment is a matter of public concern.
Many courts and commentators have attempted to establish when a
privilege should be accorded to misstatements of fact concerning public
men.2" The "absolutist" position has been frequently advocated by Mr.
Justice Black who concurred in separate opinions in both the New York
Times and Rosenblatt cases. Justice Black would extend an absolute
privilege to anyone who chose to attack a public official on the ground
that all libel and slander laws violate the constitutional protections of the
first amendment. Speaking of the publication in the Rosenblatt case, Jus-
tice Black stated that it was this very kind of publication that the New
York Times rule was adopted primarily to protect.
Unconditional freedom to criticize the way such public functions are
performed is . . . necessarily included in the guarantees of the First
Amendment. And the right to criticize a public agent engaged in public
activities cannot safely.., depend upon whether or not that agent is
arbitrarily labeled a "public official" . . . An unconditional right to say
what one pleases about public affairs is ... the minimum guarantee of
the First Amendment. 2 1
Justice Black thus solves the problem of who is a public official in a very
simple manner: he believes that all libel laws infringe upon the constitu-
18 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
19 See Note, 75 YALE L. J. 642, 651 (1966).
20 For some examples where the "public official" designation has, and has not, been ap-
plied, see Note, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1429, 1443-1444 (1965) ; Bertlesman, Libel and Public Men,
52 A.B.A.J. 657 (1966); Note, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 376 (1965); Note, 30 ALBANY L. REv. 316
(1966); Note, 34 FORDHAM L. REv. 761 (1966).
21 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1966):
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tional liberties of free speech and press and that therefore they should be
barred in both federal and state courts. 2 The absolute privilege doctrine
advocated by Justice Black has met with strong criticism, and as one
commentator has put it, to adopt his view is tantamount to holding that
"a completely open season on public officials would best serve the public
interest. Fabricated charges of embezzlement of public funds, of bribery,
of espionage for a foreign power, could be made freely and without legal
accountability under this view." 2 3 Few courts or commentators would
carry the guarantees of the first amendment as far as this, nor would the
majority in Rosenblatt v. Baer.24 While the Supreme Court has only ap-• I
plied the privilege to make good-faith misstatements of fact to cases
involving those responsible for the conduct of governmental affairs the
door has been left open to expand the privilege in future decisions and it is
here submitted that the dictates of public interest demand such an ex-
pansion.
What direction should this expansion take? While it does not appear
that our highest court is going to abolish the laws of libel, the privilege
should be extended beyond the narrow class of public officials so that it in-
cludes matters of public concern as well. What appears to be an intelligent
analysis of the whole problem is contained in the majority opinion written
by Justice Burch for the Kansas Supreme Court in Coleman v. MacLen-
nan, the leading case expressing what was heretofore the minority view.23
It was this case which Mr. Justice Brennan relied upon in formulating the
New York Times rule, though Justice Brennan did not adopt all of its
tenets. The Kansas court felt that
. . . the correct rule, whatever it is, must govern in cases other than
those involving candidates for office. It must apply to all officers and
agents of government, municipal, state and national; to the manage-
ment of all public institutions-educational, charitable and penal; to
the conduct of all corporate enterprises affected with a public interest
... and to innumerable other subjects involving the public welfare.26
Thus the Kansas court would consider privileged any communication made
in good faith upon any subject in which the party communicating had an
interest or duty-public or private, legal, moral or social. The constitu-
tional privilege, therefore, should not be limited to cases involving "public
officials" but should include matters of public concern as well.
22 d. at 95.
23 Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation,
49 CONE.Lt L. Q. 581, 596 (1964). For reference to others following somewhat varied "abso-
lutist" positions, and for a criticism of Justice Black's stand, see Pedrick, supra at 595 n. 50.
24 "This conclusion does not ignore the important social values which underlie the law of
defamation. Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks
upon reputation." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
25 Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
26 d. at 735-736.
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Federal and state decisions since 1964 indicate the difficulty en-
countered because of the indefiniteness of the rule expounded in Times and
Rosenblatt and the need for the establishment of uniform guidelines to
govern the application of this privilege. Some courts have rigidly followed
Times and do not apply the privilege unless the plaintiff may in some way
be designated a "public official." Other courts, adopting the reasoning of
Judge Burch in the Coleman decision, have expanded the Times rule to
include matters of public interest and public figures, and it is submitted




A brief analysis of defamation cases decided since New York Times Com-
pany v. Sullivan could be instrumental in formulating the extent of the
privilege accorded by that decision. For purposes of discussion, these cases
may be classified into three general groups: 1) those which have refused
to recognize the privilege where the plaintiff is merely a public figure and
not a public official; 2) those which have applied the Times rules where
the plaintiff, though not a public official, is closely associated with a public
official; and 3) those cases in which the plaintiff has voluntarily pressed
his views upon the public concerning a matter of public concern.
Of the first group of cases, Associated Press v. Walker 7 and Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts2 are representative. In the Associated Press case
a well-known former general brought suit for libel against a newspaper
association for reporting that he had led a charge of students against fed-
eral marshals and had assumed command of a crowd in riot at the Univer-
sity of Mississippi campus. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed a
judgment for plaintiff, adopting as its rationale the pre-Times majority
view (as espoused in Post v. Hallam2") that only statements of opinion,
and not of fact, were privileged. The Texas court apparently considered
the New York Times rule inapplicable because the plaintiff was not a"public official." And in the Curtis Publishing Co. case a football coach
secured a libel judgment in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit against a national magazine which published an article stat-
ing that he collaborated with another coach to fix a football game. The
case never reached the Times rule because it was held that defendant
waived any defense on constitutional issues (thereby waiving the Times
defense) by failing to raise objections at the trial level. However, the
27 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.Civ.App. 1965).
28351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965).
29 Post Publishing Company v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530 (6th Cir. 1893).
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court pointed out that it did not regard the plaintiff, an employee of a
state university, as a public official within the meaning of the New York
Times decision."0
In the second group of cases mentioned above the courts have extended
the Times rule to situations where the plaintiff, though not a public official,
is so closely associated with a public official that the rule can be said to
apply to him. Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Company"' and Gilberg v.
Goffi32 are examples of this limited extension of the Times rule. The
Pearson case held that a newspaper columnist who advocated the cause of
a senatorial candidate could not sue for libel under the Times rule unless
actual malice was shown. The reason given was that plaintiff occupied the
same standing in law as the senatorial candidate whose cause he was pub-
licly supporting. Similarly, in Gilbert v. Gofli the defendant made charges
of conflict of interest against a candidate for mayor on the ground that
the candidate was a member of a law firm that practiced in the municipal
courts of the city. Plaintiff, the candidate's law partner, sued for libel
alleging that the editorial derogated his professional integrity. The court
invoked the Times rule and held that plaintiff's action was "so closely
related to criticism of a public official that the Times case is determina-
tive." '"
In the above cases, whether or not plaintiff was a "public official" or
closely associated with such official was a determinative factor in the ulti-
mate decision. However, two recent cases have abandoned the "public
official" test and instead have applied a "public figure" or "public con-
cern" test. In so doing, these cases have stated excellent guidelines for
future application of the New York Times rule.
In the first of these cases, Pauling v. National Review, Inc.,34 plaintiff,
winner of the Nobel Prize for chemistry and the Nobel Peace Prize,
brought a libel action against the corporate owner, the individual publisher
and the editor of a national periodical for an article to the effect that
plaintiff was un-American and a Communist sympathizer. The complaint
was dismissed directly on the doctrine of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
30 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra note 28, at 712-713 n. 23. One judge dissented, be-
lieving that defendant could not have waived a constitutional right which had not been enun-
dated at the time; see 351 F.2d 702, 723-724 (dissenting opinion). For cases which have not
invoked the Times rule, see: Youssoupoff v. C.B.S., Inc., 48 Misc.2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d 754
(Sup. Ct. 1965) (assassination of Rasputin) ; Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 219,
250 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1964), aff'd 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965) (fictional biography of a baseball
player); Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1964), aff'd 254 N.Y.S.2d
80 (1964) (alleging that a former professional boxer cheated to win his title).
3133 U.S.L. WEEK 2307 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1964).
32 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964), af'd 15 N.Y.2d 1023, 260 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1965).
33 Id. at 825.
34 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1966).
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which had been decided after suit was initiated but before this decision
was rendered. The New York Supreme Court expressly pointed out that
neither Times8" nor Rosenblatt86 limited the privilege to make good-faith
misstatements of fact to just those cases which involved "public officials"
and that therefore the court was justified in expanding the rule to include
those who have voluntarily placed their opinions and actions before the
public. The court held, therefore, that when a "private citizen has, by his
conduct, made himself a public figure engaged voluntarily in public discus-
sion of matters of grave public concern and controversy . . ." 31 then such
citizen cannot recover for defamatory falsehood unless it is proven that
the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with a reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
A similar conclusion was reached in Walker v. Courier-Journal and
Louisville Times Company, Inc.88 The plaintiff, again General Walker,"
sought judgment for libel against a newspaper and a radio and television
station for comments made by those media in reliance on reports released
by the Associated Press. In dismissing the complaint the District Court
held that by virtue of the Times decision the freedom of expression had
superseded the law of libel in matters of "grave national interest." The
court recognized that Walker was not a "public official" within the mean-
ing of the Times decision. However, the language of the Kansas Supreme
Court in Coleman v. MacLennan ° was quoted with approval in arriving
at the conclusion that if the matter were one of public concern the priv-
ilege should be recognized. In a concise summary the District Court held:
... [T]he Supreme Court of the United States has served clear notice
that the broad Constitutional protections afforded by the first and four-
teenth amendments will not be limited to "public officials" only, for to
have any meaning the protections must be extended to other categories
of individuals or persons involved in the area of public debate or who
become involved in matters of public concern.41
One of the functions of the first amendment is to protect freedom of
speech and of press on all matters in which there is some element of pub-
lic participation.42 In January of 1967, the United States Supreme Court,
35 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
86 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
87 Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 269 N.Y.S.2d 11, 18 (1966).
88 246 F.Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
39 See discussion of Associated Press v. Walker, supra, note 27.
40 "This privilege extends to a great variety of subjects and includes matters of public
concern, public men, and candidates for office." Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 714, 98
Pac. 281, 285 (1908).
41 Walker v. Courier-Journal, 246 F.Supp. 231, 233 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
42 Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation,
49 CORNELL L. Q. 581, 592 (1964).
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perhaps recognizing the conceptual difficulties in the "public official"
limitation," moved in the direction of expanding the constitutional priv-
ilege. In Time, Inc. v. Hill,44 Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press pre-
clude the application of the New York statute to redress false reports
of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant
published the report with the knowledge of its falsity or in reckless
disregard of the truth.
The Supreme Court, then, has apparently recognized that the privilege to
make good faith misstatements of fact applies whenever the matter in-
volved is of grave public concern and legitimate public interest. The rea-
soning of the Kansas Supreme Court in Coleman v. MacLennan, in hold-
ing that the privilege exists where the subject involves important matters
of public concern, should therefore be explicitly adopted as establishing
the extent and limits of the constitutional privilege.
IV
DEFAMATION IN CALIFORNIA
In California the cases involving defamation of a public official have con-
cerned themselves more with an interpretation of Civil Code §47(3) than
with the constitutional basis for affording a privilege to a good faith com-
munication concerning a public official or public figure that is a misstate-
ment of fact.45 The Civil Code provides:
A privileged publication or broadcast is one made ... 3. in a communi-cation, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one whois also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such relation to theperson interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing themotive for the communication innocent, or (3) who is requested by theperson interested to give the information.46
The whole problem, therefore is resolved somewhat differently in Cali-
fornia, but several similarities to the Times and Rosenblatt decisions may
be found in the California cases. The leading California case on the sub-
ject is Snively v. Record Publishing Company.47 It was there decided that
43 Note, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1429, 1443-1445 (1965).
44...... U.S 87 S.Ct. 534, 542 (1967).
45 "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press." Cal. Const. art. I, §9. See Albany v. Meyer, 99 Cal.App. 651,
279 Pac. 213 (1929).
46 WEST'S CAL. CiV. CODE §47(3) (1964).
47 Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921). This decision expressly
overruled Jarmen v. Rea, 137 Cal. 350, 70 Pac. 216 (1902), and Daphiny v. Buhne, 153 Cal.
757, 96 Pac. 880 (1908), wherein it had been stated that a false statement of fact concerning a
candidate for office was not privileged.
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the privilege provided by Civil Code §47(3) which protects communica-
tions concerning the acts of a public officer was not lost merely because
the charge complained of was false. Since under California law a libel is
defined as a "false and unprivileged communication," 48 the court held that
a publication had to be both false and unprivileged in order for it to con-
stitute actionable libel. The language of the Civil Code was said to imply
that a publication concerning a public official would be privileged even if
untrue if made without malice. 9
The underlying rationale of the Civil Code section and of the Snively
decision was expressed some six years after the Snively case in Jones v.
Express Publishing Company which also concerned public officials:
The doctrine of privileged communications rests primarily upon publicpolicy. Under the proper circumstances the interest and necessities of
society become paramount to the welfare or reputation of a private indi-
vidual, and the occasion and circumstances may for the public good
absolve one from punishment, even though they may be false.50
In language remarkably similar to that of the Kansas Supreme Court in
Coleman v. MacLennan5 the court further stated that it was the duty of
every citizen to fairly and impartially criticize the faults of public officers
which impair their usefulness for the office which they seek or hold.52
While the preponderance of California cases interpreting Civil Code
§47(3) have been concerned with public officials and candidates for of-
fice,"3 the California courts have not limited the privilege of good-faith
misstatements of fact to criticism of public officials only. On the contrary,
a close analysis of Civil Code section and representative cases interpreting
that section seem to indicate that the California courts have applied the
very test advocated in the first part of this comment-viz., that a privilege
should be found vhenever the matter involved is one of "public interest."
In such cases actual malice must be proven and malice is defined as a
publication made "with knowledge of its falsity or without an honest belief
4 8 WEST'S CAL. CIV. CODE §45 (1954).
49 Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 574, 198 Pac. 1 (1921).
50 Jones v. Express Publishing Co., 87 Cal.App. 246, 255, 262 Pac. 78 (1927).
51 Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
5 2 Supra note 50.
53 Cf. Eva v. Smith, 89 Cal.App. 324, 264 Pac. 803 (1928) (city councilman); Morcum v.
San Francisco Shopping News Co., 4 Cal.App.2d 284, 40 P.2d 940 (1935) (president of city
council); Maher v. Devlin, 203 Cal. 270, 263 Pac. 812 (1928) (recall of mayor and city council),
Babcock v. McClatchy, 82 Cal.App.2d 528, 186 P.2d 737 (1947) (re-election of district attor-
ney); Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal.App. 381, 22 P.2d 569 (1933) (recall of city councilman);
Howard v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 95 Cal.App.2d 580, 213 P.2d 399
(1950) (chairman of committee sponsoring recall of city officials) ; Boyich v. Howell, 221 Cal.
App.2d 801, 34 Ca.Rptr. 794 (1963) (candidate for re-election to city council) ; 12 U.C.L.A.
L. Rav. 1420 (1965).
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in its truth or without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true... . "
A privilege to make good-faith misstatements of fact concerning those
responsible for various aspects of the state educational system has been
recognized on several occasions. Thus in Heuer v. Kee55 a non-malicious
publication falsely stating that a schoolteacher had mistreated one of her
students was held to be privileged. An in Everett v. California Teachers
Association5 6 plaintiff, the acting superintendent of a school district, sued
the defendant for libel in publishing a report which was critical of his
qualifications for his position. The court, in dismissing the complaint,
stated: "A publication seeking to convey pertinent information to the pub-
lic in matters of public interest comes within the purview of the privilege
in Civil Code §47(3)." 5 7 It is admitted that in both of these cases the
court could possibly have made an argument for classifying the plaintiffs
as "public officials" since both of them were paid by the county school dis-
tricts. However, "public interest" or "public concern" was the test applied
rather than that of a "public official."
Cases and controversies involving disputes among members of labor
unions have led to frequent application of the privilege accorded by Civil
Code §47(3), and especially sub-section (1) which provides that a priv-
ileged communication is one made without malice "to a person interested
therein by one who is also interested." 58 Thus in Jeffers v. Screen Extras
Guild, Inc.,5" the court held that a labor union was an association of per-
sons with a common interest and that therefore non-malicious statements
concerning the manner in which the union was being operated were priv-
ileged by the Civil Code. And in DeMott v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters60
it was stated: "Statements made without malice wholly within the ranks
of a labor union during a dispute between contending factions over union
policies and administration.., should be regarded as privileged." 6
The privilege in the Civil Code has been recently applied to still other
areas. In Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc.62 a lawyer brought suit on
54 Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal.App.2d 447, 453, 48 Cal.Rptr. 817 (1966). The court ad-
mitted that the California test for "actual malice" was not as stringent as the test established in
New York Times.
55 15 Cal.App.2d 710, 59 P.2d 1063 (1936).
56 208 Cal.App.2d 291, 25 Cal.Rptr. 120 (1962).5 7 1d at 294; accord, Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 Cal.App.2d 340, 121 P.2d 761
(1942).
58 WEST'S CAL. CIV. CODE §47(3) (1) (1954).
59 162 Cal.App.2d 717, 328 P.2d 1030 (1958).
60 157 Cal.App.2d 13, 320 P.2d 50 (1958).
61 Id. at 27; cf. Noral v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal.App.2d 348, 104 P.2d 860 (1940);
Doria v. International Union, 196 Cal.App.2d 22, 16 Cal.Rptr. 429 (1961); Emde v. San
Joaquin County etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 143 P.2d 20 (1943) ; Krause v. Bertrand, 159 Cal.
App.2d 318, 323 P.2d 784 (1958); McMann v. Wadler, 189 Cal.App.2d 124, 11 Cal.Rptr. 37
(1961).6 2 Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc., 54 Cal.2d 643, 7 Cal.Rptr. 618 (1960).
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an article which charged him with deliberately misleading the court in a
previous trial. The California Supreme Court relied on Jones v. Express
Publishing Co.' in holding that it was the privilege of every citizen and
every newspaper to comment on the conduct of public officials and that
statements of opinion, although of a defamatory nature, were privileged
under Civil Code §47(3). Emphasis was placed upon the fact that Maid-
man held a position of importance in the Jewish community and that com-
ment about his qualifications was a matter of legitimate interest to the
members of that community.64
In one of the most recent California cases on the subject, Williams v.
The Daily News Review,"5 it was stated that under §47(3) of the Civil
Code matters of public interest and comment thereon were privileged
whether the publication was in the form of an opinion or was a false state-
ment of fact. The privilege was not limited solely to cases involving "pub-
lic officials." Rather, the privilege was said to apply where the subject
matter of the article was "determined to be of public interest or the de-
famed individual of renown among a certain interested group." 66 Here the
alleged libel concerned a report charging contractors with tardiness in a
street paving job and this was considered of sufficient public interest to
come within the scope of the privilege.
Thus, California courts seem inclined to extend the "comment" priv-
ilege to include good-faith misstatements of fact about a person who is a"public figure," or a matter which is of public interest.
John Alkazin
63 Jones v. Express Publishing Co., 87 Cal.App. 246, 262 Pac. 78 (1927).
64 Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc., supra note 62 at 649.
65 Williams v. The Daily News Review, 236 Cal.App.2d 405, 46 Cal.Rptr. 135 (1965).
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